


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
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LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT FROM A MARITIME PERSPECTIVE

BY

COMMANDER PETER B. OPSAL
United States Navy


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LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT FROM A MARITIME PERSPECTIVE

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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This paper looks at the U.S. Navy's contribution to the National Military Strategy of deterrence in the threatening environment of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). It describes how LIC is politically and militarily defined, examines the LIC environment from a maritime perspective, discusses the four categories in which the military can be involved, and finally, suggests some alternatives for maritime forces in the LIC environment. Through analysis of the examples sighted, this paper will highlight the viability and effectiveness of a maritime force in LIC.

Up until the erosion of the Soviet Union's position as a superpower, the U.S. Navy, primarily a blue water navy, concentrated on the inevitable war at sea. This war against a formidable Soviet Navy, would occur should the U.S. best efforts at deterrence fail. Discounting the response to a global nuclear attack, the Navy, in its strategic and futuristic planning, was preparing to support the fight against a large scale Soviet invasion in Europe. Its role was to employ a multi-front attack on the Soviet homeland from the sea causing the Soviets to disperse their forces, and ultimately, to distract their focus on Western Europe.

Today, the threat has changed. The bipolar world and the influence the two superpowers wielded has changed. The opportunity and potential for less powerful nations to threaten peace and stability exists. Third world countries are no longer spectators but rather players looking to stake their claims or establish their position in the new world order. As the lesser developed countries emerge, unsophisticated and low technology weapons, which are available and affordable, will be used. The non-conventional methods and techniques used to employ these cheaper weapons are effective especially in an environment less intense than war. This lower level of conflict involves greater risks which the less powerful countries are willing to take. Now, and in the future, will be a time when Low Intensity Conflict will prevail and have a predominant effect on regional stability and world peace. This is a time when the U.S., its leaders, and its military will have to rethink the definition of

deterrence and adjust its efforts to maintain its leadership role as the world superpower. For the Navy, in particular, that will mean a shift in emphasis from the "War at Sea" concept, which relied on a layered defense, to a threat scenario occurring much closer to land. Defense against this littoral threat will require quick detection of enemy offensive intent and an instantaneous computation of a fire control solution tied to weapon systems that can deliver an almost immediate response. For the Navy, it will require a much more stringent and well defined set of rules of engagement (ROE). Commanders will be leading smaller forces and with less top down guidance. It will truly be "control by negation" where the commanding officer responds appropriately to the situation, simultaneously reporting up the chain of command, and continues to fight in accordance with the ROE unless redirected by higher authority. Weapons release, or pulling the trigger, will be a decision made by the Commanding Officer relying extensively on his ship's sensors, on watch personnel, experience, knowledge, training, skill and at times intuition. This period of Low Intensity Conflict will require a force structure better trained and better educated in the tactics and mind set of the enemy. It will require its leaders at the tactical level to be cognizant of the stated diplomatic and political objectives and to understand the second and third order effects their actions may incur.

The U.S. Navy, by its nature, has some intrinsic characteristics and unique capabilities that no other military

force can provide. Its potential to exploit enemy vulnerabilities greatly enhances the probability of achieving political, economic, and military objectives. It can go where no other force can go. It can move on a moment's notice and can be in position anywhere in the world in a matter of hours or days. Its configuration is not fixed and it can support many types of operations or contingencies. The mere presence of the Navy can have a psychological effect that alone, may be the deterrent desired. In the absence of the Soviet threat, it is unopposed on the high seas and can literally move at will anywhere it so desires. All in all, the U.S. Navy is a viable and effective force to achieve the national strategic objective of deterrence in the emerging predominant threat environment of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC).

To determine the optimum use of this force and to plan for future requirements, the regime of LIC must be defined. The President, in his National Security Strategy for 1990 addresses LIC as "the struggle of competing principles and ideologies below the level of conventional war."¹ He further identifies some of the attributes of LIC, and clearly states his strategy for dealing with it.

Poverty and the lack of political freedoms contribute to the instability that breeds such conflict. Our response must address these underlying conditions . . . It is not possible to prevent or deter conflict at the lower end of the conflict spectrum in the same way or to the same degree as at the higher. American forces therefore must be capable of dealing effectively with the full range of threats, including insurgency and terrorism. . . . We will improve the foreign language skills and cultural orientation of our armed forces and

adjust our intelligence activities to better serve our needs. Units with unique capabilities in this environment will receive increased emphasis. Training and research and development will be better attuned to the needs of low-intensity conflict.²

LIC is also defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in The Doctrine for Joint Operations and described categorically.

LIC is politico-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. LIC ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.³

Additionally, the military is usually assigned a subordinate role, primarily in four specific categories.

LIC is a broad endeavor within which nonmilitary aspects normally predominate. In the specific case of the US military instrument, LIC involves types of operations which could occur across the entire operational continuum. US military aspects of LIC include four categories of operations: combatting terrorism, peacekeeping, support for insurgency and counterinsurgency, and peacetime contingency operations.⁴

The LIC environment is unique in that there are no set boundaries or prerequisites. "For the United States, LIC involves threats that are usually subtle, indirect, and long-term but with potentially serious implications for US national security interests."⁵

Operating in this environment requires support from many of the elements of U.S. national power. These include political, economic, informational, and military elements.

The United States has diverse means for employing the

elements of national power in support of its objectives in the LIC environment. Among these tools are moral and political example, military strength, economic incentives, alliance relationships, public diplomacy, security assistance, development assistance, science and technology cooperation, international organizations, provision of information, and diplomatic mediation.⁵

The military's contribution is performed in a number of activities such as security assistance, combatant command cooperative programs, combined training exercises, port visits, mobile training teams, deployments for training, intelligence support, subject matter actions, psychological operations, engineer support, construction assistance, medical exercises, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, civil-military operations, and infrastructure development.⁷

The military elements provided in LIC, are usually in an indirect supporting role to other U.S. government agencies, primarily the State Department. "The primary role for the U.S. in the LIC environment is to promote the security of US friends and allies through assistance programs that focus on training, advisory assistance, intelligence, logistics, health services, engineer support, and supplying and servicing military equipment and munitions."⁸ Additionally, combined exercises and exchange programs conducted by the military for another country provide opportunity for civil activities and on a larger scale support for that country's infrastructure. That is not to say the military will not be used in a direct combat role or be given a combat mission.

At the direction of the NCA [National Command

Authority], US combat forces will normally be introduced into a LIC situation to conduct direct combat operations when vital US national interests or US citizens' well-being cannot otherwise be adequately protected. US combat forces also may be deployed to provide security for combat support or combat service support elements.⁹

The LIC environment also imposes some restraints on the military element that must be thoroughly understood and carefully complied with. These restraints come in the form of legal restrictions and social constraints. "Military operations in the LIC environment may be highly visible and politically sensitive. They require careful compliance to international, US, and host-nation law, including multinational and bilateral agreements and congressional authorizations and appropriations."¹⁰

What makes the LIC environment different from that of conventional war is that those at the highest levels must have complete understanding of the parameters of the operation, what constitutes success or failure and at what point the military involvement is to be terminated. "As such, military planning for the LIC environment must, of necessity, be an open-ended and interactive process that is adaptive to the political and policy drivers of the US Government and its foreign policy at any stage of the process."¹¹

The doctrine for LIC defines a set of imperatives on which planning and conduct of operations for the military can be based. These imperatives are: primacy of the political element, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, perseverance, and restricted use of force. For the military, these imperatives have some very

specific meaning.

Primacy of the Political Element. . . . The political objectives will affect the military decisions. Specific political objectives must be thoroughly understood at every level so that the military operations will bring about the desired results.

Utility of Effort. . . . The military will need to interact with other government agencies and host-national institutions. Unity of effort calls for interagency integration and coordination.

Adaptability. . . . Adaptability is the skill and willingness to change or modify existing structures and methods to accommodate different situations (for example, doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, training, equipment, organization, and leadership). It requires careful mission analysis, comprehensive intelligence, and regional expertise. . . . Successful military operations in the LIC environment will require the military not only to adapt existing methods and structures but also to develop new ones appropriate to each situation.

Legitimacy. . . . US military commanders must remain aware that their actions can enhance or detract from the legitimacy of their host government.

Perseverance. . . . Low intensity conflicts seldom have clear beginnings or endings. Perseverance helps ensure that both civilian and military leadership reject limited short-term successes in favor of actions that support long-term goals.

Restricted use of force. . . . The rules of engagement (ROE) in the LIC environment will usually be more restrictive, more detailed, and more subject to the political scrutiny that during other types of conflict. . . . excessive violence can adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short and long-term goals. However, overly restrictive ROE can result in needless casualties and restrict a commander's flexibility and options.¹²

LIC policies and strategies are developed and coordinated by the National Security Council (NSC). Available to them are the various government departments and agencies. The Secretary of

Defense (SECDEF) has an assistant, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict), assigned specifically to be principal staff assistant and civilian adviser for overall supervision of LIC activities within the Department of Defense. Within the military, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides advice (to the President, SECDEF, and NSC) on LIC matters, develops and establishes joint doctrine, and formulates policies for joint training and education in LIC policy. Additionally, he is the channel through which directives from the National Command Authority (NCA) are passed to the combatant commanders. The combatant commanders, once assigned, will coordinate with respective ambassadors or some representative of the State Department to facilitate plans and operations. This coordination process follows the Country Team concept.

The political and dynamic nature of the LIC environment poses organizational and coordination challenges for the combatant commanders and their staffs that demand considerable flexibility and intellectual agility. The military element of national power will seldom be in the lead, and the direct application of US combat capabilities is the least likely or preferred option.¹³

The Navy in particular can perform uniquely well in a number of these activities and these activities or missions are defined in the Maritime Strategy.

In 1986 Admiral James D. Watkins published "The Maritime Strategy." This was a naval strategy, part of a much larger military strategy, based on "deterrence, forward defense, and alliance solidarity."¹⁴ It was designed to counter the threat

of Soviet expansionism and their efforts for world domination. At the time, this threat was the most predominant threat to U.S. ideology, self preservation, and goals for world peace. The 1986 naval strategy focused primarily on deterring an all out nuclear exchange, and on supporting a conventional war in Europe which the U.S. and its European allies had been anticipating for almost forty years. Peripherally, it addressed the much less notable, yet potentially as dangerous, environment of LIC.

The possibility of an all out nuclear exchange continues to exist between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the only two countries with a world devastating capability. However, the consequences of such an exchange and the capability of the other to retaliate, has precluded such an event and neither side sees it to their advantage to use those weapons as a means of achieving their desired objectives. Joseph Nye, a leading scholar of international politics concludes; "But the power derived from nuclear weapons has proven to be so awesome and destructive that its actual application is muscle-bound. Nuclear war is simply too costly."¹⁵ Ballistic missile submarines, as addressed in the 1986 Maritime Strategy, are the Navy's strategic leg of the nuclear triad and continue to be strategically positioned to ensure the Soviet nuclear threat is kept in check.

In support of the would-be conventional conflict in Europe, naval forces would support the National Strategy of deterrence, forward defense, and alliance solidarity. This strategy would be executed by a naval military strategy of peacetime presence,

crisis control, and deterrence of war. Should the deterrence fail, the Navy's objective would be to contribute to a favorable outcome of the war by destroying enemy forces, protecting the sea lines of communication, and by supporting the land battles. The pre-war objectives specifically addressed the LIC environment and were to provide the means of avoiding a more intensive conflict preempting any war at all.

The peacetime presence and crisis response aspects of the Maritime Strategy covered a major portion of the operational continuum as perceived in 1986 (Figure 1). As a result of the




Fig. 1 THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

significant events that have taken place, protests at Tiananmen Square, Perestroika, Glasnost, the fall of the Berlin Wall,

Japan's economic growth, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the world order is changing and many would contend that we have gone from a bipolar world to a multipolar world. Economic and political power shifts are creating this new world order which is altering the security interests and national will of the U.S. and many third world countries respectively. This change has reshaped the perceived curve of the operational continuum and more closely resembles the curve conceived by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations' Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603), (figure 2). For the Navy, the increased probability that LIC




Fig. 2 THE OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM

will occur, does not necessarily change the strategy but opens

the door for added opportunity and tougher challenges to be effective in its continued strategy of deterrence. The need for world-wide presence becomes even more significant. Stabilizing regional conflicts and crises in the third world countries will become the focus of U.S. efforts to encourage world peace.

Naval forces have been called on to perform their missions in over 80% of the crises since World War II because of their unique capabilities. Admiral Watkins identified these specific capabilities in his Maritime Strategy.

- Forward-deployed posture and rapid mobility make naval forces readily available at crisis locations world-wide, providing significant deterrent value and reducing the likelihood of ambiguous or short warning.
- Naval forces maintain consistently high states of readiness because of forward deployments, ensuring operational expertise and day-to-day preparedness.
- Naval forces increasingly operate with friendly and allied armed forces and sister services.
- Naval forces can be sustained indefinitely at distant locations, with logistics support relatively independent of foreign basing or overflow rights.
- Naval forces bring the range of capabilities required for credible deterrence. Capabilities demonstrated in actual crisis include maintaining presence, conducting surveillance, threatening use of force, conducting naval gunfire or air strikes, landing Marines, evacuating civilians, establishing a blockade or quarantine, and preventing intervention by Soviet or other forces.
- Perhaps most importantly, naval forces have unique escalation control characteristics that contribute to effective crisis control. Naval forces can be intrusive or out of sight, threatening or non-threatening and easily withdrawn.¹⁶

This list clearly identifies how naval forces are particularly adept at operating in the LIC environment and can be an effective

force in dealing with such threats. The maritime strategy of deterrence, peacetime presence, and crisis response will not change; however, the context in which it is applied must be fully understood and appreciated in order to utilize this element of power to its greatest extent. To understand the effectiveness and possible uses of Naval forces in the LIC environment, each of the four categories of LIC should be examined.

The first category, Insurgency/Counterinsurgency, is a rising or rebellion in an open revolt against an established authority or a deliberate effort to stop such a revolt. This category generally passes through three phases: "latent or incipient (Phase I), which is characterized by emerging leadership and infrastructure building; guerrilla warfare (Phase II) in which the insurgence transition to offensive hit and run tactics; and conventional warfare or a war of movement (Phase III)."¹ There is no set time line or time requirement for each phase and not all insurgencies pass through all three phases. Insurgencies are more easily countered in Phase I.

Whether supporting or countering an insurgency, understanding the political and ideological motivations and objections is critical to devising an appropriate strategy. "Knowledge of the nature of the conflict and the cultural and geographical environment are essential to provide constructive advice and determine appropriate support requirements."¹

Support for insurgencies are conducted as Special Operations and are based on Presidential finding and Congressional mandates

and/or restrictions. Support is generally provided in clandestine or covert operations. The military's role is primarily in the "training and advising of insurgent forces in the tactics, techniques, and procedures of unconventional warfare."¹² This support comes in the form of advisory and training assistance, intelligence support, logistic support and command, control and communication (C³) support.

The controlling agency in our government in support of counterinsurgency is the National Security Council with its Board for Low Intensity Conflict. This body will coordinate the national policy and strategy for counterinsurgency. The Department of State has the responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of U.S. interdepartmental activities overseas. Its United States Information Agency (USIA) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) support U.S. foreign policy objectives and carry out nonmilitary U.S. foreign assistance programs respectively. The Department of Defense, on the other hand, has the primary role of facilitating the security of friends and allies through assistance programs. Under this department is the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and the Security Assistance Organization (SAO), all of which make it possible to furnish material, training, services, and advisers. Finally, there is the United States Diplomatic Mission which, headed by the Ambassador, is a group of representatives from every U.S. department and agency in the host country which will assist in

the counterinsurgency plan.

The U.S. supports host-nation counterinsurgency through the internal defense and development (IDAD) concept. Under this concept, the host nation is responsible for the development and execution of programs to prevent the insurgency. By their taking political, economic, and social action on identified, genuine grievances of their people, the U.S. government can provide support through foreign internal defense (FID) operations. "In determining the most appropriate military measures to be taken for assisting FID, specially trained selected, and jointly staffed US military survey teams, including intelligence, counterintelligence, special forces, psychological operations, and civil affairs personnel, may be made available."²⁰ Military FID support comes in advisory and training assistance, intelligence support, logistic support, civil military operations (CMO) (to include civil affairs, military civic action, humanitarian assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, and psychological operations), C³ systems support, and U.S. tactical operations.

Support of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies is very much dependent on the host country. This support is controlled at the highest level of our government, generally the State Department, and the military's role is subordinate, primarily providing assistance. "These activities also provide a US Government presence that may add support to the host nation's effort; however, the visible presence of US military personnel may, in

some cases, be counterproductive."²¹ Naval and Marine forces have the unique capability of positioning themselves out of area if necessary. Colonel Wallace C. Gregson Jr., USMC, in his article on sea-based indirect warfare, points out that in countering an insurgency, the local governments must remain in the forefront. Once the U.S. takes the lead and becomes the focal point, they lose. He points out that through the Navy/Marine Corps ability to be based at sea, "we can instantaneously control our level of intervention based on the local government's degree of acceptable behavior. Thus we help the local government fight its own corrupt elements."²² Planning of the special operations must consider many of the political, economic, and sociological factors of the host country and their support for such operations.

In this category, the Navy has historically played a subordinate role, primarily providing training and advisors in the area of special operations. In the future, the Navy could play a much more active part by promoting self-sufficiency through civil-military operations. This could occur by lengthening the stays of port visits to allow for more structured and more comprehensive humanitarian and civic assistance programs. This would have to occur early on and even pre-Phase I of an insurgency to be effective. Such programs could include Naval construction battalions and deployable medical commands (hospital ships). These assets would be fully manned and equipped to provide needed assistance, education and technical

training as well as equipment and material. The Naval combat forces could provide tactical training and conduct joint exercises with the host nation military throughout the duration of these extended visits. "When President Duarte of El Salvador first met the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he said; 'You have been selling us fish for years. Now teach us to be fishermen.'"²³

Through the security assistance programs, riverine, coastal defense boats, and even small amphibious assault units could be built and provided. This would boost their self defense posture and alliance capability. Training of these third world countries' navies could be enhanced by short, preplanned training missions or deployments to include tactical training and joint exercises.

Although this crosses into nation building, it certainly establishes interest from a military standpoint and confirms a U.S. commitment to support these countries' efforts to counter insurgencies.

A second category, Terrorism, is "a form of ideologically spawned violence, purposefully unpredictable and thus seemingly random, used by subversive elements who are striving to achieve a political, ideological, religious, economic or military goal."²⁴ The stated and unstated objectives are many and the methods used are diverse. "Regardless of their motivation or methods, the goal of all terrorists is imposition of their will on society or a group within society using violence or the threat of violence

designed to create an atmosphere of fear."²⁵ Terrorism, when targeting U.S. interests, attacks our government's credibility and effectiveness in providing international influence. The U.S. has a strategy of deterrence based on the following guidelines:

(1) The US Government is opposed to domestic and international terrorism and is prepared to act in concert with other nations or unilaterally when necessary to prevent or respond to terrorist acts.

(2) The US Government considers the practice of terrorism by any person or group a potential threat to its national security and will resist the use of terrorism by all legal means available.

(3) States that practice terrorism or actively support it will not do so without consequence. If there is evidence that a state is mounting or intends to conduct an act of terrorism against this country, the US will take measures to protect its citizens, property, and interests.

(4) The US Government will make no concessions to terrorists. It will not pay ransoms, release prisoners, change its policies, or agree to other acts that might encourage additional terrorism. At the same time, the US will use every available resource to gain the safe return of American citizens who are held hostage by terrorists.

(5) The US will act in a strong manner against terrorists without surrendering basic freedoms or endangering democratic principles. The US will ask other governments to take similar stands.²⁶

These guidelines are important because until they are understood, the role or mission of the military will not make sense. Here again, the military or use of force is not always the first alternative. The Department of State, Department of Justice, or the Department of Transportation will act as the lead agency in combatting terrorism. The Department of Defense will assist any of these agencies when asked or directed. The

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict), the military combatant commanders, the intelligence and counterintelligence components of the Military Services, the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, and the Counterterrorist Joint Task Force are also available when assigned. U.S. military response will occur at either of two levels; "... deterring acts of terrorism through active and passive measures (antiterrorism) or employing forces to directly address terrorist situations (counterterrorism)."⁷ Tasks that may be assigned to the military include: intelligence, security, hostage negotiations, hostage rescue, and assault operations. While conventional forces may be used, support is usually provided to specialized units and carried out as either a joint or combined operation.

In the past, the U.S. Military's involvement against terrorism or counterterrorism has been somewhat limited. As stated in the guidelines, the U.S. Government will make no concessions with terrorists nor be influenced in its decisions by such violence. An exception to this and in conflict with the stated guidelines was the Iran-Contra Affair. This aberration was clearly a negotiation or deal for release of hostages, and coordinated directly from the highest levels of the National Security Council. Measures have been taken to prevent further occurrences.

Terrorist acts are effective in accomplishing their objectives. When terrorist acts occur, the Navy is often times

called to respond and can be positioned in nearby waters to show presence. By providing presence, the U.S. sends a strong indication that it intends to respond and will take action if appropriate. Conversely, when response is not feasible or force cannot be legitimately applied, the movement of forces gives credence to the terrorist act and credibility to the terrorists intention of drawing attention to their issue or cause.

On 29 October 1983, a terrorist suicide bomb blew up in the Marine Corps barracks killing 241. "Various Sixth Fleet units were ordered to Beirut, both to reassert the U.S. presence and to assist in rescue operations. . . . On 26 February 1984, the withdrawal of the USMC contingent of the international peacekeeping force was completed."¹⁸ In another case, the Navy and the other services, in a joint operation attempted to rescue the hostages held captive in Iran. This effort, planned with incredible risk, ended in disaster, leaving 8 U.S. servicemen dead, proving too difficult and too hard a mission to accomplish.

These examples are not sighted to suggest the military should not be utilized, but rather to identify the risk and difficulty in dealing with such a threat.

One occasion the Navy was effective in dealing with terrorists was during the capture of the hijackers of the ACHILLE LAURO. "On 7 October 1985, following the Palestinian terrorist hijacking of the Italian cruise ship ACHILLE LAURO, Sixth Fleet vessels (including CV-60 SARATOGA) moved to the Eastern Mediterranean. On 10 October, F-14s from SARATOGA forced an

Egyptian airliner with the hijackers aboard to Italy, where the hijackers were taken into custody."²

Naval forces were also effective in deterring further acts by known and identified terrorists.

Following terrorist attacks on 27 December 1985 in the Rome and Vienna airports, a series of Freedom of Navigation operations in the Gulf of Sidra (Operations in the Vicinity of Libya, OVL) were approved. Code-named 'Attain Document,' the first two (26-30 January and 12-15 February) occurred without incident. During 'Attain Document III' (23-29 March 1986), two SA-5 missiles were shot at U.S. aircraft by a SAM sight on 24 March. Over the next 16 hours, two Libyan patrol boats were sunk by USN aircraft. . . . On 5 April, the La Belle Discotheque in the Federal Republic of Germany was bombed, resulting in the death of one U.S. serviceman and many injured. On 14 April, aircraft from the carriers CORAL SEA and AMERICA, as well as USAF FB-111s from Lakenheath AFB in the United Kingdom, struck targets in Libya.¹⁰

What the Navy can do against terrorists or terrorism is limited because of the elusive nature of the threat. Intelligence can follow known terrorist leaders like Abul Abbas, Abu Nidal, and Abu Ibrahim and others linked to terrorist organizations. However, unless one of them legitimately claims responsibility or can be positively linked to the terrorist act, response or retaliation is difficult and unlikely.

In the future, the Navy should continue its intelligence efforts to identify the leaders and the centers of gravity of those organizations, and when legitimately assigned, apply appropriate force to deter further terrorist acts. Special forces should be trained and tactics developed to infiltrate, exploit and undermine the infrastructure of their organizations. In a broader sense, Naval Forces can be used in support of a

blockade to enforce sanctions against any country supporting terrorist activities. Additionally, the U.S. should continually monitor its security measures to reduce its vulnerability to indiscriminate attacks both home and abroad.

In summary, terrorism is an unconventional weapon with no guidelines or boundaries. It is effective in accomplishing its mission and very difficult to defend against or deter. However, with a strong political position and more active role for the military, Naval Forces can be effectively utilized to respond.

The third category, Peacekeeping Operations, is generally a military activity with some very stringent guidelines. It is designed to support diplomatic efforts of achieving or maintaining peace in areas where there is or could be conflict. "The single most important requirement of a peacekeeping operation is consent to the operation by all the parties in the dispute."¹ Peacekeeping operations are generally conducted under the sponsorship of the United Nations or some other national organization.

When a peacekeeping organization is established, preconditions are determined and maintained throughout the operation. Some of these essential preconditions are:

- Consent, cooperation, and support of the parties to the dispute.
- Political recognition of the peacekeeping force by a portion of the international community.
- A clear, restricted, and realistic mandate or mission with specified and understood rules of engagement.
- Sufficient freedom of movement for the force, or

observers, to carry out their responsibilities.

- An effective command, control, and communications system.

- Well-trained, disciplined, impartial, and professional forces.

- An effective and responsive intelligence capability.³²

The mandate is a key element which describes the size and type of force each nation will contribute. From the mandate, a Status of Forces Agreement is established which forms the legal status of the force or mission. "Based on the peacekeeping mandate and the stationing agreement, the specific terms of reference, follow-on command directives, and rules of engagement are established."³³

Military personnel participate in the following peacekeeping operations: peace observation, internal supervision and assistance, and monitor terms of protocol. A request for a peacekeeping mission from the United Nations, involving military personnel, is passed from the State Department to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who selects a Joint Staff directorate to organize the required support. The Joint Staff directorate then forms a joint action cell. "The joint action cell develops written taskings and coordinates these taskings with the affected combatant command, services, and other agencies."³⁴ Operational command of the units assigned are transferred to the commander of the peacekeeping force. However, the combatant commanders retain command authority of their units or attached elements.

Military support for the peacekeeping missions takes the form of logistics, observers, or peacekeeping forces. A peacekeeping mission must provide legitimacy and be accepted, and the goals and objectives must be clearly understood. Physical security of the deployed force must remain a high priority and the procedures and actions to maintain that security must be firmly established and enforced.

The Navy, at times, has performed this peacekeeping mission by maintaining open and free sea lines of communication. Escorting the Kuwait tankers in and out of the Persian Gulf during the Iran Iraq war is an example, and one which can be applied to any of the trade routes and choke points throughout the world. Naval forces can effectively provide transportation and logistics to areas with access to the sea and provide vertical lift to others with a less amenable terrain. Naval carriers can contribute to this mission by providing airfields off the coasts of countries without adequate facilities and through the carrier airwing, project a presence hundreds of miles inland. The Navy has the capability to land and insert Marines and Navy SEALs, forces that are self-sustaining and well prepared for providing security, security training, and if needed humanitarian services.

In the future, a peacekeeping force may be required in Israel and areas designated for Palestinian occupation. Following an agreement by both Israeli and Palestinian leaders and a request to the United Nations for a peacekeeping force,

U.S. military personnel could be assigned to assist in the transition. The Marines are well trained and adept in providing this kind of support. Sufficient in number, Marine presence alone could provide credibility to the settlement and maintain the stability needed to ensure a peaceful evolution.

Other areas that may require peacekeeping forces are India and Pakistan, North and South Korea (once reunification is agreed to), and those countries in South Africa undergoing political and economic changes, struggling to resolve deep-seated racial prejudice and human rights issues. For the U.S. or United Nations to interfere with the internal struggles of these nations setting their own standards raises the question of legitimacy. However, human rights and world peace are national objectives and as a world leader, the U.S. should be compelled to influence some kind of resolution to stop violence. Here again, Naval Forces under U.N. sanction, can provide transportation and logistics for an appropriate Marine force to diffuse chaos in instances where human suffering has reached life threatening conditions (starvation, disease, and atrocities). The Navy could also provide humanitarian assistance with its hospital ships and medical support personnel. This measure to provide influence would be expensive and require an adjustment in force structure; however, the effect may outweigh the cost.

Lastly, Contingency Operations is the category in which Naval Forces are most often involved. The activities that occur in this category are generally operations not necessarily

independent of the other three categories. These activities include; disaster relief, show of force, noncombatant evacuation operations, recovery, attacks and raids, freedom of navigation and protection of shipping, operations to restore order, security assistance surges, and DOD support to counterdrug operations.³⁵ These may occur as a specific mission or as a series of simultaneously occurrences. It is in this category of LIC that Naval Forces are utilized because of the unique capability for which they are best suited: to perform at sea, and to project power ashore immediately and quickly. Still, the requirement to coordinate and plan operations with other U.S. agencies and departments responsible for the various elements of national power must occur before, during, and after each operation.

Contingency operations take place throughout the operational continuum. Military forces are used to enforce or support diplomatic initiatives, respond to emergencies, and protect U.S. lives. They may be used when diplomatic measures are ineffective or when quick and decisive measures are required. "They are usually managed at the highest levels of government, normally short in duration, and often involve joint and/or interagency operations."³⁶ Repercussions from the public, foreign or domestic, may occur when contingency operations are conducted because of the controversial ethical, moral, and political implications of their purpose.

The factors involving the nature and scope of each operation varies.

These include the duration of the operation, the mobility and flexibility of available forces, available intelligence, overflight and/or country basing rights, available refueling assets, logistic support, communications support, psychological and civil affairs operations, public affairs, security requirements, and operational constraints.¹⁷

Each of these factors may be critical to a successful outcome and depending on the nature of the conflict must be taken into consideration at the outset and throughout the planning process.

It is in the Contingency Operations where the military plays the biggest and usually lead role and many traditional military tasks are utilized.

Show of force is probably the most frequent role the Navy fulfills through its continuous deployment cycles and numerous port visits made each year. The effect of a deployed carrier battle group tying up to the piers or anchoring off the shores of an underdeveloped or third world country cannot be measured. The awesomeness and physical evidence of real military power reassures the confidence or confirms the fear that they imagine by being an ally or foe of the United States. This has been done purposely, and in the future possibly more often, to maximize this effect. A prime example was the Naval presence during the 88' Summer Olympics.

During the Summer Olympics in Seoul, South Korea, the United States deployed forces to deter a feared disruption of the Olympics by North Korea. At one point, two CVBGs (Nimitz and Midway) were operating in the Sea of Japan providing an augmented U.S. Navy presence during the Olympics.¹⁸

These Naval Forces were not observable from Seoul, which enabled South Korea to maintain sovereignty as the host, yet the position

of these forces just over the horizon provided a potential response that a would-be aggressor would have to consider. Some would contend this Naval presence had little or no affect on the decisions of those threatening to disrupt the games with violence. However, others contribute the games being played as scheduled without the threatened violence, to the influence of the Naval presence.

Again, as with the other categories of LIC, understanding of the political objectives and possible consequences of military actions is critically important. This makes the decisions on the Rules of Engagement, set by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vital to the outcome of the operation. Were violence to occur, the role of the Navy could have been to insert Marines and Special Forces security teams to quell disruption and flush out terrorists. U.S. Marine Forces could be assigned security missions to protect the participants and civilians and if necessary conduct a non-combat evacuation operation (NEO).

NEO is another mission the Navy and the Marine Corps are particularly adept at conducting due to the mobility of air and sea assets and capability to access any country not landlocked. Naval and Marine Forces can get in and get out on short notice. NEO usually occurs without resistance or use of force, but Naval and Marine Forces are prepared to use force for self protection if necessary. Recently on two separate occasions, Naval and Marine assets consisting of amphibious, surface and special forces effectively conducted NEO off the coasts of Liberia and

Somalia. In both instances, these missions were well planned, occurred on short notice, and successfully executed. With the proposed outlook of instability within the regions of the various third world countries, and the growing number of countries in which Americans are stationed, NEO will likely to occur more frequently than in the past.

In an attempt to increase warning time which enables an appropriate response, the requirement to improve intelligence in the third world will increase. The Navy's special operations forces, the Navy SEAL (sea, air, and land) Units can contribute. In coordination with other service special units, Navy SEALs will undergo specialty training and perform their unique missions in support of an overall objective. Other Naval assets will be relied on for insertion and extraction and in cases of evacuation, be required to provide transportation for those civilians and military evacuating. In all of these operations, the political objectives will clearly determine commencement and termination of each unique tasking.

Included in Contingency Operations are some domestic crises or issues in which the military can uniquely support or provide assistance to. Disaster Relief, for one, is a mission that, in the short term, falls in the hands of anyone or any agency that can help. The Navy has the capability to provide transportation, food, shelter, medical and in the aftermath, support to reconstruction efforts. In the past, the Navy has been called on to come to the rescue, most recent examples being Hurricane Hugo

on the East coast of the U.S. and the San Francisco earthquake in California. In these instances the Navy provided rescue, medical, security assistance, and even emergency electrical power.

Counter Narcotics Operations is another area in which the Navy has a supporting yet significant role. In September of 1988, the Department of Defense (DOD) was named as the single lead agency responsible for detection and monitoring of air and sea transit of illegal drugs into the U.S. Joint task forces were established on both coasts to coordinate this effort and subsequently, have utilized Naval assets extensively for detection, tracking, command, control and communications as well as for interdiction. Each year since the DOD became involved, the dollars allocated to support this effort have been increasing. The Navy, with its sophisticated technical radars and tracking mechanisms and the versatile platforms (air and sea) that can participate in this mission, has added significantly to what was previously a hopeless effort to stop the transfer of illegal drugs. Should the political element assign DOD the mission of eliminating the supply and the demand elements, the Navy could also contribute. In countries where the substances are grown and processed, the Navy could be used to locate and destroy the crops and facilities. Additional assistance would then have to be provided to influence production of alternative agriculture products. On the demand side, Naval facilities (possibly bases designated for closure) could be used as

rehabilitation centers to help addicts and those suffering from the effects of abuse. Here again, the political and economic elements play a dominant role which require diplomacy and tough decisions by U.S. leadership fix the problem.

Contingency Operations is the category of LIC that is less easily defined yet contains some very specific missions. The manner in which each of these evolve or are carried out is contingent on the situation and yet must follow specific guidelines and controls. The Navy has and will continue to be a major player in this category.

As previously discussed in the Maritime Strategy, the most likely conflict in the future will be in the LIC environment. With political emphasis off the bipolar Cold War, the desires for change by third world countries with ineffective governments and dissatisfied people will emerge. The U.S. objective of achieving world peace through deterrence and influence will continue as it strives to prevent the escalation of any conflict from reaching a level of war and if possible, preventing the conflict altogether.

U.S. presence and especially military involvement is not always beneficial. In some cases, even the slightest indication that the U.S. is providing support can cause a negative response. In most cases though, the close proximity of U.S. Forces and the perceived response accompanying that presence works as a deterrent to the destabilizing belligerent. An example of this presence could have been a Naval carrier battle group patrolling the Persian Gulf prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Had our

Naval Forces been more visible prior to the invasion and even had they demonstrated their potential (a tomahawk missile destroying a designated target inside Iraq territory), Saddam Hussein may have been influenced to rethink his strategy. Granted, the variables involved (historical, religious, ethical, and political), and the logic of his decision process were never fully understood. The influence of Naval presence however, could have had an significant effect and prevented his miscalculated actions.

Operating in the LIC environment involves a risk that is much greater than that of conventional warfare. James Webb, former Secretary of the Navy states: "Our military units are often more vulnerable than they should be because political rules have given an enemy a weird sort of equality by reducing our own level of power to the point that the enemy can compete."⁹

In this environment of LIC, the link between the political and the military is critical. Every element of a LIC operation is so very sensitive in nature, that not fully understanding the consequences of actions taken can result in an undesirable or unexpected outcome. Diplomatic and military objectives do not always coincide and the commander in the field must have full appreciation for the decisionmaker's desires. Again, the pre-Iraq war is an example of the complex LIC environment.

The purpose of U.S. military involvement, before hostile action, was to defend the Saudi/Iraq boarder, influence the leadership of Iraq to withdraw its troops from Kuwait, and to

prevent a dictator from controlling the world's oil resources. Here, the U.S. attempted to resolve a conflict diplomatically using military means (Naval assets in show of force, embargo, blockade, preservation of the freedom of navigation, and protection of shipping) which were measures short of conventional war. While the military solution was to put Saddam Hussein, his dominating force, and his weapons technology out of commission, the diplomatic option was chosen and the military was required to operate in the LIC environment. Until the decision to enter into conventional warfare was made, the conflict was in the hands of the diplomats and politicians. Military action deviating from the diplomatic solution could have had critical implications and disastrous results, losing the legitimacy and credibility needed to hold the coalition together and public support necessary to achieve the stated objectives.

There must be an understanding of the capabilities of the deterrent and the objectives that are to be achieved. Again, former Secretary Webb suggests three things when operating in this environment.

We must establish a better balance between our political objectives and our military forces. We must clarify for ourselves and for the world that we know when to shoot and how much to shoot. And, above all, we must review the vital bond between the commander in the field and the Nation at home.⁴⁰

Subsequently, the U.S. Military in general and specifically, the U.S. Navy, did exactly that in "Desert Storm."

In summary then, what is the Navy's contribution in LIC? Well, the Navy plays in all four categories of LIC. It may have

a small mission or it may be given the lead and required to achieve all stated objectives. It can coordinate with other departments, services and even other nations. The Navy can maintain a world-wide presence, is deployable, flexible and in many cases, may provide a unique set of options not otherwise available.

The U.S. Military is reducing its force structure. This means that the assets the Navy will have available to deal with these contingencies will be much more limited. To compensate for this reduction, the Navy will have to become more efficient, work smarter, and rely to a greater degree on its flexibility, specialized training and intelligence.

There will be a reduction in the number of ships. Combatant units will have to be used more for missions other than "defense of the carrier" or "war at sea." Independent tasking and joint allied operations will probably increase. Single ship missions, visiting foreign ports, frequent patrolling of the sea lines of communication and strategic choke points, and possibly, escorting merchant shipping will become more common. With fewer ships, reliance on technology to create effective multi-mission platforms will be necessary. Centered on contingency operations and missions, ships will need coastal close-in defense. They will need to be equipped with detection, tracking, and destructive weapon systems that will provide a defense in a close to hostile land environment. They must also be capable of delivering a retaliatory punch that would cause a belligerent to

give serious consideration before launching a hostile attack. Former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral C. A. H. Trost, addressed the difficulty in countering the LIC threat as well as how best to deal with it.

an aggressor always has the advantage of the initiative at first. He may select where and when to strike, and afterwards, the challenges for the opposing side are to contain the strike and regain the initiative. . . . When the threat is a boat, you do not want to meet it with a boat; you want a ship, a helicopter, and an airplane; and perhaps that will deter the next threat.⁴¹

Improved communications suites and data links must also be provided to facilitate effective joint mission and training opportunities with other services and allied forces. As in conventional war, intelligence is critical and sharing information and data with our allies will be essential as coalition forces supplementing U.S. Forces will become the norm.

Lieutenant General George L. Butler of the Joint Staff, in a speech titled "New Directions in American Strategy," refers to the Chairman's "Base Force" as the linchpin to the new military strategy. This concept responds to regional threats with regional strategies and regional forces, Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East being the three primary regions. Everything else is referred to as the "rest of the World." "It is the come-as-you-are world of 48-hour response times to spontaneous, often unpredictable crises calling for highly trained, ready forces that are air deliverable and largely self-sufficient."⁴² To deal with this lesser regional contingency or LIC, a contingency force would be established. "The Contingency Force would

comprise Army light and airborne divisions, Marine Expeditionary Units, Special Operations Forces and selective Air Force capabilities, buttressed as necessary by carrier and amphibious assets."⁴³ Here again, specialized and highly trained forces to perform specific missions, would respond to the unique and sensitive requirements of LIC. Navy SEALs and Amphibious Expeditionary forces will continue to exercise their skills, training, and expertise when needed.

In conclusion, the threats associated with LIC are more prevalent today than ever. The military does have a mission in this environment and will be needed to achieve desired objectives. The Navy, through continued presence, power projection, utilization of advances in technology, extensive and meaningful port visits, and participation in joint allied exercises, can make a significant contribution to this effort. Whether the U.S. can consistently deter war in the LIC environment will depend on its effective use of military power. With a strong Naval presence and forces that are mobile, flexible, highly trained and specialized, the necessary regional influence can be established to meet the challenges that threaten peace and stability.

ENDNOTES

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4. Ibid.
5. United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, Joint Pub 3-07, p. I-3 (hereafter referred to as "JCS Pub 3-07").
6. JCS PUB 3-07, p. I-6.
7. JCS Pub 3-07, p. I-6.
8. JCS Pub 3-07, p. I-9.
9. JCS Pub 3-07, p. I-10.
10. JCS Pub 3-07, p. I-11.
11. JCS Pub 3-07, p. I-11.
12. JCS Pub 3-07, Pp. I-11 - I-13.
13. JCS Pub 3-07, p. I-14.
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19. JCS Pub 3-07, p. II-7.
20. JCS Pub 3-07, p. II-8.
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33. JCS Pub 3-07, p. IV-2.

34. JCS Pub 3-07, p. IV-4.

35. JCS Pub 3-07, pp. V-5 - V-10.

36. JCS Pub 3-07, p. V-1.

37. JCS Pub 3-07, pp. V-1 - V-2.

38. CNA Study, p. 42.

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42. Speech by George L. Butler, LTG, USAF, Washington, 27 September 1990, p. 11.

43. Ibid.

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